. Over the past four decades, governments and international organizations have promoted decentralized community-based forest management (CFM) to achieve sustainable forest use and reduce rural poverty 4 . In decentralized decision-making arrangements, the primary responsibility for day-to-day management rests with forest user communities. Ideally, this allows communities to make better use of their time and place-specific knowledge to promote more efficient, equitable and sustainable multi-functional landscapes 5 . Local communities now legally manage approximately 13% of the world's forests 6 . Nonetheless, debates about whether CFM truly reduces forest loss and alleviates poverty continue 7, 8 . Case studies from Latin America, Africa and South Asia show that some CFM initiatives have improved forest and livelihood outcomes 9, 10 , but that others have not achieved the intended objectives 4, 11 . The vast majority of existing studies have focused on limited sets of cases, and have used qualitative assessments of poverty and livelihood outcomes that are difficult to compare across space and over time 7 . These studies have helped to identify how land tenure, local autonomy and collective action may contribute to effective and equitable CFM, but have not tested whether CFM programmes lead to net environmental and socioeconomic improvements at national scales 7 . Some studies use more rigorous evaluations of CFM but they generally focus on single outcomes, studying the relationship between CFM and either forests [12] [13] [14] or poverty 15, 16 -often at single points in time 17, 18 . We analyse forest cover change and poverty alleviation outcomes of CFM for the case of Nepal using a high-spatial-resolution, national-level, longitudinal dataset (see Methods). Our study makes three key advances. First, we analyse the average effects of CFM at a national scale using a near-complete census of Nepal's 18,321 registered community forests. Second, we combine these data with subdistrict-level, national census-based multidimensional poverty measures (2001-2011) and high-resolution forest cover change data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . Finally, given the multiple drivers of deforestation 19 and poverty alleviation 20 , our approach aims to separate CFM impacts from other potential socioeconomic and biophysical factors affecting the establishment of CFM that could also impact forest and poverty outcomes (see Methods). Specifically, we combine statistical matching and multiple regression analyses to control for potential geographic, economic and political drivers of outcomes at the subdistrict level. These include: slope, elevation, precipitation, population density, agricultural effort, international migration, travel time to market and population centres, distance to district headquarters, presence of protected areas, and baseline measures of poverty and forest cover, as well as administrative-level fixed effects that control for factors common to each district, such as government investments in education or health. These methods seek to ensure that treated and control groups are similar to each other 21 , and follow established quasi-experimental approaches to the evaluation of conservation interventions [22] [23] [24] . Our identification of impacts relies on plausibly exogenous conditional variation in CFMs arising from the history of multiple non-government organizations, government agencies and international donors, operating in non-systematic ways across time and space (see Methods). We test the robustness of our results with respect to potential unmeasured confounding variables, such as other government programmes that may be correlated with CFM (see the section 'Sensitivity analyses' in the Methods, and Supplementary Information). Our analysis advances the literature by: (1) assessing rigorously the effect of community forests on reductions in both deforestation and poverty alleviation; (2) evaluating poorly understood tradeoffs between the two outcomes; and (3) investigating how poverty moderates the success of CFM-a critical link that has received only limited attention.
Several factors justify our Nepal focus. The country has a longstanding CFM programme that was first initiated in the 1970s and subsequently supported by key legislative reforms and substantial international aid from the late 1980s to the present 25, 26 . Estimates suggest that one-quarter of the country's forests are directly managed by more than one-third of the country's predominantly rural population 26 . Nepal's forests are distributed across different ecoregions (subalpine high mountains = 32%; temperate and subtropical middle hills = 38%; tropical lowlands = 30%) 27 . The country's CFM programme is large but not exceptionally so. Several countries (for example, Mexico, Madagascar and Tanzania) have similar CFM programmes 12, 15, 28 , and others are developing them (for example, Indonesia). Although the context may be somewhat different, lessons from Nepal may provide useful insights for other countries with similar types of forest decentralization policies. Importantly, relevant government agencies made the necessary data available for integration across sources and spatial scales.
Various complex direct and indirect mechanisms may contribute to net reductions in deforestation and poverty as a result of CFM in Nepal and other countries. Under CFM, community forest user groups (CFUGs) can establish and enforce rules to promote more sustainable use and flows of forest resources over time. These CFM land-use restrictions can limit agricultural production, logging and ) . b,c, Postmatching differences in forest cover change (b) and poverty alleviation (c) between VDCs with and without CFM, and VDCs with large (L) and small (S) amounts of area under CFM, as well as VDCs in which CFM arrangements have been in place for long (L) and short (S) durations. In b, we used a Lambert W transformation to reduce the influence of outliers. Estimates were generated using predicted values to estimate marginal effects. Asterisks indicate postmatching linear regression results that are significantly different from zero (Supplementary Table 1 ): ***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05. The VDC-level shapefile we used for our analysis is available from the Ministry of Home Affairs of Nepal 38 .
forest product extraction, leading to less deforestation, reduced forest degradation and faster reforestation rates. Substantial household benefits can come from the ongoing, but more sustainable, use of timber, construction materials, firewood, food and medicinal plants, as well as fodder for livestock and composting materials for agriculture 29, 30 . Households may also gain income directly from sales of forest products through forest-based enterprises. Such revenue streams can account for as much as half of households' income 29, 31 . In some instances, communities also use internal levies from forest products to fund community-level infrastructure improvements, promoting long-term development and community benefits. However, both levies and use restrictions may disproportionally burden those unable to afford them 32 . In extreme cases, CFM benefits could be captured by only a few households, failing to reduce average poverty levels.
We first assessed the impact of CFM on deforestation and poverty using longitudinal data for 3,832 of Nepal's 3,973 village development committees (VDCs; our unit of analysis; Fig. 1a ), which are subdistrict administrative units equivalent to municipalities in other countries. We compare VDCs with any CFM (mean area under CFM = 13%) with VDCs that are similar in biophysical and socioeconomic characteristics but without CFM (see Methods and Supplementary Information for robustness tests using treatment allocation thresholds). More than 80% of community forests were established between 1993 and 2002 25 . We thus focus on CFM arrangements established before 2000 for our main analysis (but see Supplementary Information for additional analyses of CFM established after 2000, and for robustness checks that support our main findings using additional forest cover change data and comparisons of poverty metrics). Our approach uses variation in the establishment of CFMs, after controlling for confounders, driven by multiple international donors and non-government organizations working with the government during this period (see Methods and Supplementary Fig. 1 ).
After controlling for confounding variables, we find statistically significant net positive relationships between CFM and forest cover change (P = 0.011; Fig. 1b We also assessed whether the area under CFM and the duration of CFM arrangements affected deforestation and poverty, by focusing only on VDCs with CFM arrangements (n = 2,138). We find that larger CFM areas (>8.3% of VDC area) were significantly linked to reductions in poverty among CFM VDCs (P < 0.002; Fig. 1c and Supplementary Table 2 ). This effect is equivalent to larger CFM areas lifting 14 more households out of poverty per VDC than smaller CFM areas (s.e. = 0.48). This is compared with 273 poor households in matched control VDCs (s.e. = 8.8), representing a relative poverty alleviation of 4.9% in VDCs with a larger CFM area. Similarly, a longer duration of CFM arrangements (mean establishment duration > 3.4 years) led to significant reductions in deforestation (P = 0.007) and poverty (P = 0.015). These effects are equivalent to 1.2 ha of avoided deforestation (s.e. = 0.27) and 9.8 households lifted out of poverty (s.e. = 0.49). This is compared with mean deforestation levels of 5.9 ha (s.e. = 0.82) and poverty of 293 households (s.e. = 7.6) in matched control VDCs, representing a 20% relative reduction in deforestation and a 3.4% relative reduction in poverty in VDCs with longer-duration CFM arrangements. These results suggest that greater benefits result from longer-term investments and larger areas committed to decentralized CFM.
Reductions in poverty can be driven by environmentally degrading natural resource extraction (for example, unsustainable logging). We therefore analysed whether CFM leads to winwin outcomes, to understand whether impacts on deforestation and poverty alleviation trade off. To do so, we constructed a three-level ordinal outcome variable, defining VDCs with lower than the median deforestation and higher than the median poverty alleviation rates as win-win outcomes 9,10 ( Fig. 2a ; see Methods). We find that among matched VDCs, those with CFM had a 51% higher probability of being linked to win-win outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline win-win probability = 20%; P < 0.001; Fig. 2b and Supplementary Table 1 ) and a 36% lower probability of being linked to lose-lose outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline lose-lose probability = 36%). Similarly, we find that among matched VDCs, those with CFM arrangements that had been in place for longer had a 5.3% higher probability of being linked to win-win outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline win-win probability = 25%; P = 0.009) and an 11% lower probability of being linked to lose-lose outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline lose-lose probability = 26%; Supplementary Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 2). The above median deforestation and poverty alleviation values are conservative classifications of win-win outcomes. To validate the effect of CFM on win-win outcomes, we also analysed different win-win thresholds (upper quartiles), a continuous joint outcome index, and datasets generated using decile deviations from median forest cover change and poverty alleviation values, to establish whether outliers influenced our results (Supplementary Information). All robustness checks led to similar results. These results build on recent efforts that evaluate either forest or poverty outcomes of CFM 12, 13, 15, 16 , and suggest that CFM has jointly improved social and environmental conditions in Nepal in the most recent decade.
Finally, we investigated how baseline poverty moderates the effects of CFM on forest and poverty outcomes. This analysis is important because the majority of community forests in Nepal have been established in less poor VDCs (Fig. 3b and Supplementary   Fig. 3) . Among matched VDCs, we find that community forests in VDCs with higher levels of baseline poverty (2001) have a lower reduced deforestation effect compared with community forests in VDCs with lower levels of baseline poverty (P = 0.004; Fig. 3a and Supplementary Table 1 ). These results suggest that new CFM established in poorer areas probably requires additional support to minimize socioeconomic and environmental tradeoffs.
Our analysis adds evidence to crucial debates in the literature by finding that CFM has contributed to lower deforestation levels and poverty alleviation through one of the world's largest and longest-standing decentralized forest management programmes 7 . The magnitudes of socioeconomic and environmental benefits that we observe are similar to those attributable to other forest-based conservation and development interventions in other countries, such as payment for ecosystem services in Mexico 33 , and have the potential to be self-funding in the long term. Although our results are specific to Nepal's case and similar studies would need to be undertaken in other contexts, our findings indicate the potential for CFM as a conservation and poverty alleviation strategy by estimating the specific impacts of CFM on forest cover change and poverty alleviation.
Communities manage an increasing amount of the world's forests globally, yet assessments of CFM outcomes are geographically skewed towards South Asian studies 7 . Social and environmental data are increasingly available at higher temporal and spatial resolutions, and future work should thus continue to estimate the large-scale joint social and environmental outcomes of CFM programmes in other countries. Yet, large-scale analyses focusing on average treatment effects, such as the one we present here, also potentially mask variations in outcomes: CFM has not led to uniform reductions in deforestation and poverty (Fig. 2a) . We find that baseline poverty levels significantly affect CFM's ability to curb deforestation. Future efforts should also continue seeking a better understanding of other factors driving variation in CFM impacts both across and within CFUGs.
Unlike programmes in Mexico 28 or Madagascar 12 , community forestry in Nepal has mainly not been managed for commercial markets 34 , but there is still great heterogeneity in CFM arrangements in Nepal and some communities have raised substantial revenue. Future analyses should thus also use more detailed household data to understand how market forces and commercial forestry influence livelihood decisions and CFM outcomes. Given the complexity of deforestation and reforestation drivers and patterns, future analyses would benefit from investment in detailed CFM boundary data and improved land-cover monitoring (including forest degradation).
Finally, decentralized forestry programmes between 4 and within countries 35 (including in Nepal) vary substantially in remit and governance structures that can substantially affect social and environmental outcomes. Future work should pay closer attention to understanding how different variants of decentralized forest management (and which aspects of difference) influence outcomes. A critically important analytical horizon concerns how (in terms of effect sizes) decentralized regimes compare to more centralized forms of forest management, such as national or even supranational protected areas 36 , other policy interventions such as sustainability certification or payments for ecosystem services 33 , and broader socioeconomic and demographic shifts (for example, international migration), which have also been linked to substantial changes in livelihoods and land cover 37 .
Methods
Our analysis relies on a longitudinal dataset constructed from publicly available sources, and statistical analyses that use variation in CFM conditional on multiple controls to estimate impacts (see Supplementary Information for additional robustness checks).
Dataset. Unit of analysis. Previous similar impact estimations predominantly used spatially explicit datasets on the interventions being assessed (for example, Lines and 95% confidence intervals (shaded areas) were generated using a LOESS smoothing function. . While our analyses cannot account for intra-VDC variation, our sample is sufficiently large to identify statistical relationships. We excluded 141 VDCs from our analysis, including 129 VDCs not sampled in the 2001 census due to the Maoist conflict and 12 VDCs where the CFM area was greater than the total area of the VDC. Including these 12 VDCs made no substantive differences to our results. Note that Nepal's 2017 constitutional reform dissolved VDCs, and reorganized them into rural and urban municipalities, and metropolitan and submetropolitan cities.
NaTuRe SuSTaiNabiliTy
Outcomes. Forest cover change. We used the high-resolution Global Forest Change dataset version 1.0 (ref. 39 ) to assess forest cover change between 2000 and 2012. This dataset measures forest presence or absence, and does not include measures of degradation (that is, forest quality). Measures of tree cover loss and gain are available as separate data files: to generate a measure of net change, we calculated the number of hectares lost and gained in each VDC and then expressed the difference between the two as percentages relative to baseline forest cover. Our forest cover change measures clustered around zero with high kurtosis, and we used a Lambert W transformation to reduce the influence of outliers 40 . We calculated average marginal effects (see below) using back-transformed values. We conducted robustness tests using the individual forest gain and loss datasets, and with forest cover change data produced by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development in Nepal 41, 42 (Supplementary Information). These tests support our principal findings.
Poverty. We used data from the Nepal 2001 and 2011 national census to generate poverty estimates at the level of individual VDCs. The census does not contain household income or consumption estimates, which are often used to measure poverty. However, poverty is increasingly considered a multidimensional concept 43, 44 . We used the Alkire and Foster method 45 to generate a multidimensional poverty index (MPI) similar to the global MPI generated by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. Our MPI also includes health, education and living standards dimensions, although individual indicators differ slightly due to data availability. We gave equal weighting to each dimension (33.3%), and equal weighting to indicators within each dimension (8.3 or 16.6%, depending on the number of indicators in each dimension). We treated missing data as in Alkire and Santos 46 . The health dimension included: (1) child mortality (the proportion of households experiencing the death of one or more children aged ≤5 years); and (2) premature mortality (the proportion of households experiencing a household death below the period life expectancy).
The education dimension included: (1) school attendance (the proportion of households with at least one school-aged child (aged 6-16 years) not attending school); and (2) years of schooling (the proportion of households with at least 1 person, aged 11 years or older, with <5 years of schooling).
The living standards dimension included the proportion of households: (1) using dung or wood as cooking fuel; (2) lacking access to electricity; (3) lacking access to clean water; and (4) lacking improved sanitation (points (3) and (4) were according to the Millenium Development Goal (MDG) guidelines in ref. 47 ). We calculated the poverty head count ratio (H) in each VDC and used this measure in our principal analysis. We aggregated indicators at the household level and defined a household as being poor if the sum of weighted indicators within or across dimensions (k) was ≥33.3% 45 . We then calculated the incidence of poverty in each VDC relative to the total number of households sampled in each census. We used the incidence of poverty because international donors commonly use the number of people benefiting from an intervention as a key performance indicator 48 . We also computed a combined measure of incidence and intensity (M 0 ) 45 as a robustness test (the results are equivalent; see Supplementary Table 3 ). To calculate M 0 , we generated a household-level intensity measure by summing up the number of indicators that a household was deprived in, then dividing this number by the total number of indicators (n = 8; that is, health dimension = 2; education dimension = 2; and livelihood standard dimension = 4). We calculated the average intensity of poverty in each VDC (A), then calculated M 0 as H×A.
We measured the levels of poverty at baseline (2001), which we used as a covariate in our analysis (see below), as well as changes in poverty between 2001 and 2011, which we used as a key outcome variable. We assessed whether our measure is reflective of household consumption by comparing district-level measures of our 2011 MPI (H) with a district-level consumption-derived poverty index 49 generated by the World Bank and Nepal's Central Bureau of Statistics, using data from the 2011 Nepal Livelihoods Standards Survey. The indices were highly correlated (r = 0.68; n = 75; Supplementary Fig. 4 ), suggesting that our MPI reflects household consumption.
Win-win outcomes. We followed Persha et al. 9 and Chhatre and Agrawal 10 to construct a three-level, joint-outcome ordinal variable. We used median deforestation and poverty estimates as cut-offs between levels. We defined VDCs with lower than the median deforestation and higher than the median poverty alleviation rates as win-win outcomes (Fig. 2a) . We defined VDCs with higher than the median deforestation and lower than the median poverty alleviation rates as lose-lose outcomes, and the remaining two deforestation and poverty alleviation combinations as 'tradeoffs' (see Supplementary Information for related robustness checks).
Treatment. CFM.
CFM can lead to reductions in deforestation and poverty through direct and indirect mechanisms. For example, land and resource rights, and the autonomy to make resource management decisions, promote collective action and the design, establishment and enforcement of local resource management rules 50 . Forest-dependent households can gain commercial and subsistence benefits from forests in the form of timber, construction materials, firewood, food and medicinal plants 51 , as well as fodder for livestock and composting materials for agriculture 29, 30 . The implementation and enforcement of local management rules can lead to more equitable and sustainable management decisions. Some communities also generate community-level income streams to fund community-level infrastructure improvements (for example, schools and health posts) by establishing internal levies for forest products (note: although levies can contribute to broader benefits, they can also disproportionally burden those unable to afford them 32 ). More sustainable forest management can enhance soil fertility, agricultural productivity, livestock production and commercialization of forest products through forest-based enterprises that can account for as much as half a household's income 29, 31 . CFM livelihood benefits could be reflected by better health and educational outcomes (for example, through better food and nutritional security, and financial solvency to access healthcare and education) and living standards improvements (for example, access to electricity, sanitation and water), which are often the focus of international donor-funded projects in Nepal 25 . Simultaneously, CFM management rules can lead to land and resource use restrictions, and subsequent reductions in agricultural expansion, logging and forest product extraction 52 . Similarly, livelihood improvements can reduce forest dependence. More sustainable forest resource use and livelihood improvements can thus lead to less deforestation, forest degradation and faster reforestation rates.
For each VDC, we used data from Nepal's Department of Forest's database on CFUGs to calculate: (1) the area under CFM (relative to the VDC size); and (2) the mean numbers of years since CFM arrangements were set in place. We excluded CFUGs with missing data on the VDC location, amount of area under CFM, or establishment dates. Our final sample included 96% of all CFUGs held in the database (17,735 of 18,321 CFUGs). As some CFUGs held in the database might no longer be active, our analysis considers some areas as treated when they effectively are not. However, this should bias our results towards finding no effect of CFUGs.
We first compared forest and poverty outcomes in VDCs with and without CFM. We used data from community forests established before 2000 for our main analyses (Supplementary Table 1 ) because: (1) as many as 80% of all CFUGs were established in the run-up to 2000 25 -our baseline year (our estimates thus represent impacts due to CFM between 2000/1 and 2011/2); and (2) a significant number of community forests in our final sample (3,341, equivalent to 38% of all CFUGs established after 2000) were established after 2006, and probably too close to the end of our study period for us to observe significant gains in forest cover and poverty alleviation (see Supplementary Information for a robustness test using community forests established after 2000 and different CFM treatment thresholds).
We then analysed the effect of the area under CFM and the duration of CFM arrangements. We created two sets of binary treatment variables-one for CFM area and one for CFM duration-that we used for our matching preprocessing. We used median values (8% of the VDC area under CFM; 3.4 years since the establishment of CFM arrangements) to generate equally sized treatment and control groups.
Matching covariates. Various biophysical and socioeconomic covariates can influence CFM (selection into the treatment) and our two outcome variables 21, 53 . We controlled for these in both our matching and subsequent regression analyses. Our selection was based on known drivers of forest cover change 19, 54 , factors known to affect poverty outcomes of conservation policies 22 , and variables thought to influence the locations of CFM, which were identified as part of a global systematic review of CFM 7 and Nepal-related reports 25, 26 and are discussed below.
Area. Area size has been linked to poverty outcomes of protected areas 22 .
Baseline forest cover. Baseline forest cover is expressed in each VDC as the proportion of forested area in 2000.
Baseline poverty. We used our 2001 census-generated MPI to control for baseline levels of poverty. We examined the moderating effect of baseline poverty on CFM using a baseline poverty and treatment interaction term.
Slope and elevation. We used the ASTER DEM version 2 (ref. 55 ) to calculate the mean elevation and slope in each VDC, which can affect agricultural suitability, forest dynamics and livelihood decisions 56 .
Precipitation. Agricultural production and forest dynamics are affected by precipitation. We used the WorldClim current precipitation (version 1.4; 1950-2000) dataset 57 to estimate mean VDC precipitation levels.
Population density. Resource overexploitation has been linked to population pressure and can drive rural migration patterns 19 . We controlled for this and urbanization using the baseline population density (2001) in each VDC (national census data).
Agricultural effort. Agriculture is a principal driver of deforestation and land-cover change globally 19 . We used the 2001 national census to generate a baseline measure of agricultural activity: the total number of months dedicated to agriculture by above-school-age household members (>16 years) divided by the number of sampled households in each VDC.
International migration. International migration and remittances have affected livelihoods and forest cover in Nepal 37, 58 . We controlled for international migration using data from the 2001 national census of Nepal to measure the proportion of households with at least one or more household members above school age (>16 years) living abroad.
Travel time to population and administrative centres. Access to technical assistance, markets and nodes of transport can influence livelihood decisions and land-use patterns 19 . We measured the travel time to district headquarters and population centres with ≥10,000 and ≥50,000 inhabitants by adapting the European Commission's Joint Research Centre's travel time to major cities algorithm 59 and combining that with Nepal's Survey Departments road data and the Joint Research Centre's global land-cover dataset 60 . We used ASTER DEM version 2 (ref. 55 ) to compute elevation and slope correction factors, and used VDC centroids as points of departure for all of our calculations.
Administrative areas. Districts are the administrative level above VDCs and have significant decision-making autonomy. Most donor-funded interventions and government programmes are implemented at this administrative level, and some districts were particularly affected by the Maoist insurgency during the 1990s and early 2000s 61 . We included district as a dummy matching covariate and fixed effect in our postmatching regression to control for these and other potentially unobserved factors that are likely to be common to specific districts.
Protected areas. VDCs inside protected areas and buffer zones are likely to be affected by different natural resource management legislation, state funding and tourism. We used the World Database on Protected Areas 62 to identify VDCs inside protected areas and buffer zones, and included a protected areas dummy variable in our matching and regression analyses.
Analysis.
Matching preprocessing and regression analysis. We combined statistical matching and multiple regressions to estimate the relationship between CFM and changes in forest cover and poverty 21, 53 . Our approach estimates impacts using conditional variation in CFM between VDCs within the same district after controlling for confounders (see below). We used a form of propensity score matching (full matching) that is particularly well suited for balanced datasets (such as ours) 51, 63 . Postmatching regression results of our three treatments (CFM presence, size and duration) are shown in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2. We used R 64 for our statistical analyses and the MatchIt package 65 for our statistical matching. We assessed covariate balance before and after matching, considering a postmatching standardized mean difference of <0.25 as an acceptable propensity score and covariate balance between treatment and controls groups 53 . Matching significantly improved the balance between all treatment and control groups in the various datasets used in our analysis ( Supplementary  Figs. 5-9 and Supplementary Tables 4-8 ). However, we also included all matching covariates in our subsequent linear and ordinal regressions (that is, a full model) to control for any remaining differences between our treatment and control groups.
We estimated predicted levels of net deforestation (ha VDC −1
) and poverty alleviation (households lifted out of poverty per VDC) in the presence and absence of CFM, among the VDCs where CFM exists. The mean difference between these predicted values is equivalent to the average marginal effect. We report the standard error of these estimates as a measure of the uncertainty in those estimates. We also report how these effects compare with mean deforestation and poverty alleviation values in control VDCs, expressing these effects in percentage-change terms. We calculated heteroskedasticity-robust (Huber-White) standard errors using the robcov function in the rms package 66 . To assess the moderating effect of baseline poverty on CFM, we included a treatment (CFM before 2000 for our main analyses, and CFM after 2000 for our robustness test) and baseline poverty interaction term (Supplementary Tables 1 and  9 ). To control for nonlinearity of the effect of baseline poverty, we also included a squared baseline poverty interaction term.
Identification strategy.
A key assumption to establish causal inference based on our methods is that, once confounding factors have been controlled for, treatment allocation is 'as if ' random. This is a plausible assumption given the history of CFM establishment within Nepal 25, 26 . Over the past 30 years, international donors have contributed more than US$237 million to support CFM in Nepal, with an additional US$8 million in funding provided by the government of Nepal. CFM expanded rapidly after the passage of the 1993 Forest Act 25, 26 , which established mechanisms for the devolution of power to CFUGs. Donor-supported programmes targeted different (but sometimes overlapping) areas of Nepal throughout this period 25 . Efforts spread mainly in the middle hills, which had historically experienced large amounts of deforestation. From our discussions with stakeholders, areas for interventions were often selected on the basis of programme priorities (for example, more development focused or more environment focused), and the process of approaching villages depended on somewhat random factors, such as whether implementing agency staff had contacts in particular villages. The government of Nepal also experienced considerable political instability and priority changes throughout this period. This externally driven, decentralized and uncoordinated process of CFM support creates a plausible source of variation that is uncorrelated with CFM conditional on included controls.
We attempted to control and test for the ways that these interventions could have been systematic or systematically correlated with other important drivers of outcomes. Given that CFM has often been led by motivations to address historically high deforestation rates-particularly in the middle hills-we included matching covariates linked to deforestation, such as slope, elevation and distance to market centres. We also included covariates that might influence the implementation of CFM, including access to district headquarters, and baseline estimates of poverty and forest cover, which have been an emphasis of donor-funded programmes. We included district-level fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant factors common to each district, such as high levels of migration, urbanization or impacts of the Maoist insurgency (although note that some previous research suggests that CFUGs were resilient to the insurgency 67 ). We tested that the conditional treatment (presence, duration and area of CFM) appears to be random, and that our postmatching regression models do not suffer from spatial autocorrelation. We did so by conducting Moran's I tests, and visual inspections of spatial distribution patterns of regression residuals and variograms. We used the spdep package 68 for our Moran's I tests, and the gstat package 69 to generate variograms.
To test for spatial autocorrelation of our treatment variables, we modelled treatment as either a null model (y n = 1) or a function of our matching covariates (equivalent to models used to calculate propensity scores). We observe a distinct spatial pattern before controlling for covariates, highlighting a higher likelihood of CFM in the middle hills. Moran's I tests and visual inspections of model residual distributions and variograms showed that the spatial autocorrelation of our treatment variables decreased significantly after controlling for our matching covariates, and that the spatial distribution of the three treatment variables (presence, area and duration of CFM) used in our postmatching regressions was close to random (Supplementary Table 10 and Supplementary Figs. 1 and 10) . Spatial autocorrelation tests of our postmatching regression models also showed no spatial autocorrelation (Supplementary Table 10 and Supplementary Figs. 11-16 ). These results are consistent with the assumption that remaining sources of variation in treatment are plausibly exogenous.
Sensitivity analyses.
We performed a series of hidden bias sensitivity analyses on our principal models to determine the potential importance of unobserved confounders for our results. We used the causalsens package 70 , which has the additional benefit over other sensitivity approaches (for example, Rosenbaum bounds 71 ) of being able to determine how hidden bias alters both the magnitude and direction of causal estimates. The results from these sensitivity analyses ( Supplementary Figs. 11-16 ) suggest that to reduce the average treatment effect to zero, non-measured confounders would have to explain at least as much variation, or substantially more, than the median variation explained by most measured covariates. Together with our spatial autocorrelation tests (see above), we interpret these results as suggesting that our models are moderately to strongly robust against hidden bias.
Data availability
Most of the raw data used in this study are available from the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal and other organizations, but restrictions apply to the availability of some of the data. These data can be made available from the authors upon reasonable request, and with permission from the relevant organizations. All computer code used in this analysis is available from the authors upon reasonable request.
